mirror of
https://github.com/actions/deploy-pages.git
synced 2025-12-08 08:06:15 +00:00
Update README.md
This commit is contained in:
committed by
GitHub
parent
277bb4bf94
commit
b8d7a0e861
@@ -83,6 +83,13 @@ There are a few important considerations to be aware of:
|
||||
|
||||
5. If your Pages site is using GitHub Actions as the source, while not required we highly recommend you also [protect your environment][environment-protection] (we will configure it by default for you).
|
||||
|
||||
### OICD
|
||||
When we invoke a job using GitHub Actions the job requests an OICD token from GitHub's OICD provider which responds with a JSON web token (JWT), each token is unique to each workflow job [learn more about OICD tokens](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/deployment/security-hardening-your-deployments/about-security-hardening-with-openid-connect#understanding-the-oidc-token).
|
||||
|
||||
OICD tokens are minted in the in the context of an Action job which help form a trust relationship between GitHub and a third-party (e.g. AWS or Azure) to determine if there's anything to be done. Hence, there is no "permissions" associated with the token itself. For GitHub Pages use cases we allow `id-token: write` to allow the `GITHUB-TOKEN` to make API calls to generate an OICD for us which
|
||||
results in the former statement.
|
||||
|
||||
A common misconception is that the OICD tokens we generate are "dangerous" this is not the case! What **can be** is what we allow a third-party to do with the OICD token that was minted for us! Another common issue is accessing the REST endpoints from Actions. The GitHub Pages calls to our endpoints from a job perspective are **only** accessible from the Actions API as of today.
|
||||
## Compatibility
|
||||
|
||||
This action is primarily designed for use with GitHub.com's Actions workflows and Pages deployments. However, certain releases should also be compatible with GitHub Enterprise Server (GHES) `3.7` and above.
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user